Shirley Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
Shirley Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lynn C. Harris; Spence, Moriarity & Schuster; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant .
M. Dayle Jeffs; Jeffs & Jeffs; Robert L. Moody; Taylor, Moody & Thorne; John M Chipman; Clifford
J. Payne; Hanson, Nelson, Chipman, & Quigley; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, No. 940550 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6186











MAR 2 3 1995 
( ^ ^ ^ % § J B E - y ¥ A H COURT OF APPEALS QQURT OF APPEALS 
SHIRLEY CARRIER, ; 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba ] 
STONE CARPETS, WILLIAM ; 
ROGER SMITH, AND PLEASANT ; 
GROVE CITY, ; 
Defendants and Appellees. ) 
) Case No. 940550-CA 
) Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH 
COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING 
LYNN C. HARRIS (#1382) 
SPENCE, MORIARTTY & SCHUSTER 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
JOHN M. CHIPMAN (#628) 
HANSON, NELSON, & CHIPMAN 
136 So. Main Street, Ste. 910 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pleasant Grove City 
M. DAYLE JEFFS (#1655) 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
90 North 100 East / P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pro-Tech Restoration 
ROBERT L. MOODY (#2302) 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
2525 N. Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee William Roger Smith 
FILED 
MAR 2 3 1995 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHIRLEY CARRIER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba 
STONE CARPETS, WILLIAM 
ROGER SMITH, AND PLEASANT 
GROVE CITY, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH 
COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING 
LYNN C. HARRIS (#1382) 
SPENCE, MORIARJTY & SCHUSTER 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
JOHN M. CHIPMAN (#628) 
HANSON, NELSON, & CHIPMAN 
136 So. Main Street, Ste. 910 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pleasant Grove City 
M. DAYLE JEFFS (#1655) 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
90 North 100 East / P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pro-Tech Restoration 
ROBERT L. MOODY (#2302) 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
2525 N. Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee William Roger Smith 
Case No. 940550-CA 
Priority No. 15 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
POINT 1: MS. CARRIER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS PROPERLY 
PROPERLY REFLECTS THE FACTS PRESENTED 
AT TRIAL AND CONTAINED IN THE 
TRANSCRIPT 1 
POINT 2: THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS REVIEWS 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF 
RULE 47 AND SUTTON USING THE 
"CORRECTNESS" STANDARD 3 
A. The trial court's decision was an 
interpretation of law 3 
B. The trial court had limited discretion 4 
C The trial court failed to give a factual 
basis for its decision 7 
POINT 3: DEFENDANTS FAIL TO MEET THE STANDARD 
AS DEFINED IN RANDLE V. ALLEN REQUIRING 
AN INDEPENDENT CROSS-CLAIM 8 
A. Randle considered factors other than 
independent cross-claims but found 
them inadequate 8 
B. The Randle decision requiring non-
derivative cross-claims strengthens 
and clarifies Sutton v. Otis 9 
C Randle's requirement of nonderivative 
cross-claims strikes the best balance 10 
D. Rule 47(c) and Randle's interpretations 
do not violate any constitutional 
provisions 12 
POINT 4: DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH A 
SUBSTANTIAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN 
THEM 14 
i 
POINT 5: MS. CARRIER NEED NOT SHOW ACTUAL 
PREJUDICE 16 
POINT 6: THE JURY'S VERDICT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 17 
A. Ms. Carrier correctly marshaled the 
relevant evidence 18 
B. The clear weight of the evidence 
contradicting the jury's verdict 
is not based on assumptions 2 0 
POINT 7: MS. CARRIER PROPERLY PRESENTED THE 
RIGHT OF WAY ISSUE 2 1 
POINT 8: THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWED DEFENDANTS 
TO MAKE IMPROPER USE OF A REBUTTAL 
WITNESS 2 2 
CONCLUSION 2 5 
i i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 
(Utah 1993) 8 
Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990) 4 
Blade v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317 (Colo. 1985) 17 
Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 
(Utah App. 1991) 2 2 
Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981) 8 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 
(Utah 1992) 12 
International-Great Northern R. Co. v. Smith, 269 
S.W. 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 11 
King v. Special Resource Management, Inc., 256 
Mont. 367, 846 P.2d 1038 (1993) 16 
Nebbia y. People of State of New York, N.Y., 291 
U.S. 502(1934) 13 
Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 
447 (Utah 1993) 2 1 
People v. Brooks, 621 N.Y.S.2d 701(1994) 2 5 
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 
(Utah 1993) 5, 6, 8-17, 22 
Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 
1069 (Utah 1991) 17 
Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991) 17-18 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 176 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1989) 7 
i i i 
State v. Carter, 256 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(Jan. 18, 1995) 21 
State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 
(March 29, 1994) 10 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 4-6 , 
State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 
(Utah 1990) 12 
State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 
(Utah 1960) 12-13 
Sutton v. Otis, 68 Utah 85, 249 P. 437 (1926) 4, 9, 10 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) 13 
Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777 (Utah 1992) 4 
U.S. v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129 
(2d Cir. 1989) 2 5 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 
(Utah app. 1991) 7 
RULES: 
Rule 32, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994) 2 3 - 2 5 
Rule 47, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994) . . . . 3, 4, 6, 12-13 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994) 2 1 - 2 2 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994) 7 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994) 2 2 
OTHER: 
32 A.L.R. 3d 747 11 
i v 
Plaintiff Shirley Carrier submits this Reply Brief in support of her 
appeal. 
POINT 1; Ms. Carrier's Statement of Facts properly 
reflects the facts presented at trial and contained in 
the transcript. 
In response to Ms. Carrier's statement of facts, Defendant Pleasant 
Grove alleges that counsel has been "inaccurate and misleading," and "taken 
undue liberties by going beyond the actual testimony contained in the 
transcript." Defendant's Brief at 3-4. However, Pleasant Grove fails to 
furnish even one example of counsel's purported inaccuracies. 
Throughout her Statement of Facts, Ms. Carriers cites almost every 
sentence to specific page and line numbers. Counsel for Ms. Carrier 
presented the facts in this manner so no question could be raised 
concerning their correctness. Accordingly, Ms. Carrier simply responds to 
Defendant's accusations by encouraging a review of the transcript. 
Counsel for Ms. Carrier does not want a verbal "tug of war" with 
Defendant Pleasant Grove over the facts. Nevertheless, Ms. Carrier finds it 
necessary to object to Pleasant Grove's Statement of the Facts as follows: 
- Paragraph six, page five. Pleasant Grove states that "there existed a 
substantial controversy between Smith and Pro-Tech." This is one of 
the primary issues on appeal; This is a conclusion of the defendant 
and not a fact. 
- Paragraph eight, page six. Pleasant Grove quotes a neighbor as 
saying that the stop sign had been down "no more than a day or so." 
Pleasant Grove's edited version of the quote emphasizes the shortness 
of the period. The full quote, however, states: "My recollection would 
be that it was not more than a day or so, possibly two, but I wouldn't 
think that it would exceed that." (Transcript, Vol. III-R. 1486, lines 3-
15)(emphasis added). 
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- Paragraph ten, page seven. Pleasant Grove claims that city 
employees "ideally" hoped that downed stop signs would be identified 
within minutes or hours. However, in none of paragraph ten's 
citations to the record do city employees characterize this as an 
"ideal." Rather than an ideal, city employees straightforwardly stated 
that they expected downed stop signs to be identified within minutes 
or hours. (Transcript, Vol. IV-R. 1855, lines 2-9; Vol. V-R. 1981, lines 
22-25 to 1982, lines 1-4). 
- Paragraph ten, page seven. Pleasant Grove states that there was no 
evidence presented to the jury that the stop sign had been down "a 
number of days." Certainly not a fact, this statement constitutes 
Pleasant Grove's opinion. Therefore, a jury might find that the 
neighbor's testimony of "possibly two" days, quoted above, means "a 
number of days." 
- Paragraph eleven, pages seven to eight. Pleasant Grove claims that 
the Court was made aware that each defendant had an interest in 
"shifting the ultimate responsibility for the accident on the other 
parties involved." None of the answers or legal memoranda 
specifically claim another Defendant at fault. The only party that 
Defendants explicitly targeted for blame was Ms. Carrier. 
- Paragraph fifteen, page nine. Pleasant Grove asserts that Ms. 
Carrier's counsel "emphasized the theme of conflict and disparate 
interests" between the Defendants during the trial. Furthermore, 
Pleasant Grove claims that counsel pinpointed this conflict as the 
"paramount issue" in the case. 
In fact, Ms. Carrier's counsel did not use the terms "conflict" or 
"disparate interests" on any of the cited pages. Rather than "disparate 
interests," counsel emphasized a theme of dishonesty among the 
Defendants which directly related to their credibility and their 
attempt to shift fault to Ms. Carrier. (Transcript, Vol. XI-R. 2555-56). 
Furthermore, counsel for Ms. Carrier did not refer to the conflict as 
the "paramount issue" in the case, rather the transcript clearly shows 
that he called truth the paramount issue. (Transcript, Vol. XI-R. 2555, 
lines 5-11). 
Facts are those items found in the record and not any party's 
characterization and/or opinion about what happened during the 
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proceedings. To the extent that Defendant Pleasant Grove attempts to inject 
opinion, conclusions of law, or to alter the facts to its own advantage, its 
Statement must be rejected. 
In addition to Pleasant Grove's Statement of the Facts, Defendant 
William Roger Smith also offers a version of the facts. Most of the 
statements provided, however, concern facts relevant to Mr. Smith's 
liability. Ms. Carrier does not appeal the jury assignment of 40% liability to 
Mr. Smith. Therefore, while Ms. Carrier does not agree that these 
statements contain the overall picture of the evidence, she nonetheless 
considers them irrelevant in this appeal. 
POINT 2: The Utah Court of Appeals reviews the trial 
court's interpretation of Rule 47 and Sutton using the 
"correctness" standard. 
Defendants argue that the trial court made a factual finding in 
awarding them three times as many peremptory challenges as those given 
to Ms. Carrier. Defendant Pleasant Grove's Brief at 1, 17-18; Defendant 
Pro-Tech's Brief at 2; Defendant William Roger Smith's Brief at 17-19. 
Therefore, Defendants contend, the standard of review is "clearly 
erroneous." Id. 
A. The trial court's decision was an interpretation of law. 
Ms. Carrier asserts that even if the trial court examined the facts, in 
deciding to step outside Rule 47(c) and allow Defendants extra peremptory 
challenges it interpreted the law. Most decisions interpreting a statute, 
rule, ordinance, or even common law, arise in the context of facts. 
Therefore, in such cases, the court usually must fasten its interpretation on 
factual determinations. Utah case law specifically recognizes that the 
interpretation of law, in a factual setting, is a legal question. 
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For example, in State v. Pena, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
whether a given set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a question 
of law. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). See also, Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 
20, 22 (Utah 1990) (Whether a party has failed to comply with statutory 
requirements and civil procedure rules, thereby meriting involuntary 
dismissal, is a legal question); Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 
(Utah 1992)(citing common law, whether a landowner owes a duty of care 
to another is a question of law). 
Here, the trial court had to interpret Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 47(c) which requires multiple parties to join in a challenge. In 
deciding whether the rule compelled Defendants to exercise their 
peremptory challenges jointly, the court also interpreted Utah common law. 
The authoritative case before the trial court, Sutton v. Otis, provides an 
exception to Rule 47(c)'s mandate when a "substantial controversy" exists 
between the parties. 68 Utah 85, 249 P. 437 (1926). Does the Sutton 
exception to Rule 47(c) apply here? What did the Sutton Court intend? 
What is a substantial controversy? These are not factual questions; a jury 
could not make the decision. Because the court based its determination on 
an interpretation of Utah law, the Utah Court of Appeals does not give 
deference to the trial court's decision. 
B. The trial court had limited discretion. 
Ms. Carrier maintains that the trial court interpreted the law and 
therefore the standard of review is correctness. However, even if the Utah 
Court of Appeals rejects this approach, the trial court's decision would still 
not be a question of fact. As the Utah Supreme Court observed in State v. 
Pena, some questions are neither purely law nor purely fact, rather they 
fall into a third category—the application of law to fact. 869 P.2d 932, 936 
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(Utah 1994). 
In this category, the Court recognizes that the "effect of a given set of 
facts is a question of law. . . ." Id. However, once the appellate court has so 
classified the issue, it still must determine how much discretion the trial 
court may use in making the decision. Id. at 937. According to Pena, the 
amount of discretion granted ranges along a spectrum, and the "closeness of 
appellate review of the application of law to fact actually runs the entire 
length of this spectrum." Id. at 938. The more limited a court's discretion, 
the closer the appellate review approaches de novo. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Pen a examined the reasons for granting 
trial judges discretion and deferential review. The Court listed three 
factors: 1) the facts underlying the legal rule are "so complex and varying" 
that no rule can be formulated which adequately address[es] the relevance 
of all these facts; 2) the situation is new; therefore the appellate judges 
cannot anticipate or articulate what factors should be "outcome 
determinative"; and 3) the trial court has observed facts which cannot be 
adequately reflected in the record. Id. at 939. 
In this case, the trial court's decision does not fall within any of the 
three factors in Pena. First, the facts underlying a substantial controversy 
are not complex and varying. Thus, in Randle v. Allen, the Utah Supreme 
Court specified those factors which do not merit additional peremptory 
challenges. 862 P.2d 1329, 1332-33 (Utah 1993). That list covers most 
scenarios that arise between multi-party litigants: separate answers, 
separate counsel, uncooperativeness, liability shifting, different claims, 
different facts, different legal theories, hostility, and derivative cross-
claims. In fact, the Randle Court lists only one fact that constitutes a 
substantial controversy—a nonderivative cross-claim. This is not a complex 
5 
and varying category. 
Second, the award of additional peremptory challenges is not so new 
that appellate courts will have difficulty anticipating or articulating 
outcome determinative factors. The first case discussing additional 
peremptory challenges was Sutton v. Otis, decided in 1926. 68 Utah 85, 249 
P. 437 (1926). Moreover, in the most recent case, Randle, the Utah Supreme 
Court listed the outcome determinative factors, those discussed in the 
preceding paragraph. 
Third, in this case the record accurately reflects the judge's first hand 
experience with the facts. The court said that it made the decision based 
upon "the nature of the case." It did not rely on witnesses' appearances and 
demeanors. 
Beyond the factors listed in Pena, the Randle decision drastically 
limits a court's discretion to award additional peremptory challenges. While 
other jurisdictions allow the trial court to adjust the number of challenges 
on each side, the Randle Court emphasized that it did "not find that degree 
of discretion built into subsection (c) of Rule 47." 862 P.2d 1329, 1333 
(Utah 1993). The Court again stressed the lack of discretionary language in 
the rule when setting forth the "substantial controversy" standard. Id. 
Finally, the Court warned that "a trial judge must carefully appraise the 
degree of adverseness among co-parties and determine whether that 
adverseness truly warrants giving that side more challenges than the 
other." Id. 
Under both Pena and Randle, the trial court had only limited 
discretion to grant extra peremptory challenges. Therefore, even if a 
correctness standard cannot be applied, the Utah Court of Appeals should 
review the trial court's decision under a less deferential, de novo standard. 
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C. The trial court failed to give a factual basis for its decision. 
Finally, because the trial court refused to any give the factual basis 
for its decision to grant Defendants extra challenges, appellate review will 
be difficult. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the 
court to find the facts specially. Ms. Carrier acknowledges that this 
mandate does not extend to a motion to limit the number of peremptory 
challenges. Nonetheless, this case illustrates the problems that arise when 
the court fails to give any sort of specifics for its decision. 
In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989), 
the Utah Supreme Court cautioned that findings must be articulated with 
sufficient detail so that the reviewing court can understand the basis of the 
ruling. See also, Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 and 478 n.7 (Utah 
App. 1991) (without adequate factual findings meaningful review is 
virtually impossible, thus placing appellate courts in awkward position of 
speculating what the trial court actually determined the facts to be). 
Here, counsel for Ms. Carrier asked the court for the grounds on which 
it made its decision. Mr. Harris explained, "Somewhere along the lines if 
there's going to be grounds for having equal preemptories [sic] each, I at 
least ought to have the opportunity of knowing exactly what it is that 
makes them so disparate in their claim. . . ." Appellant's Brief, Exhibit 2, 
page 1, lines 23-25 to page 2, lines 1-2. Furthermore, Mr. Harris petitioned 
the court to give the grounds for its decision, "for the record. . . ." Id. at 
page 2, line 5. 
The court responded by saying that "I don't think we need that." Id. 
line 10. As to the basis for its ruling, "Counsel, I feel that they are disparate 
enough, just by the nature of the case, to permit it." Id. lines 8-10. Without 
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any facts listed in the court's decision, indeed the court's refusal to place 
these facts in the record, meaningful review, no matter what the standard, 
will be extremely difficult. Cf., Aha Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 
1288 (Utah 1993) (When the trial court errs in interpreting a statute, the 
factual findings are often inadequate in light of the incorrect interpretation. 
Accordingly the case must be remanded for adequate findings.). 
POINT 3: Defendants fail to meet the standard as 
defined in Randle v. Allen requiring an independent 
c r o s s - c l a i m , 
Ms. Carrier argued in her opening brief that Randle v. Allen defines 
"substantial controversy" as requiring a nonderivative cross-claim. Brief of 
Appellant at 15. She basis this assertion on the clear language in Randle: 
"[A] 'substantial controversy' exists when a party on one side of a lawsuit 
has a cross-claim against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, a separate, 
distinct lawsuit from the action existing between the plaintiffs and 
defendants." 862 P.2d at 1333. Defendants' attempts to ignore or minimize 
this language fail. 
A. Randle considered factors other than independent cross-
claims but found them inadequate. 
Defendant Smith argues that the Randle Court allowed additional 
challenges to one defendant not because an independent cross-claim 
existed, but rather because he had a different theory of recovery. Smith's 
Brief at 22. Randle, however, explicitly rejects this approach. It observed 
that some courts have granted additional peremptories because a co-party 
had a different legal theory. 862 P.2d at 1333, citing Distad v. Cubin, 633 
P.2d 167, 171 (Wyo. 1981). The Court then warns: "We do not find that 
degree of discretion built into subsection (c) of Rule 47." Id. 
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In a similar argument, Defendant Pleasant Grove and Defendant Pro-
Tech claim that Randle focused on the cross-claim because no other factors 
evidencing a substantial controversy existed. Pleasant Grove's Brief at 19-
20; Pro-Tech's Brief at 28. The Randle Court, however, listed possible other 
factors and proclaimed that these simply do not meet the high standard 
necessary for additional peremptory challenges. These factors deemed 
inadequate include separate answers, separate counsel, uncooperativeness, 
liability shifting, different defenses, different claims, different facts, 
different legal theories, hostility, and derivative cross-claims. 862 P.2d at 
1332-33. Pleasant Grove offers no example of other factors that would fall 
outside these categories. Indeed, the examples that Defendants give in this 
case have already been rejected by Randle, as discussed below in Point 4. 
B. The Randle decision requiring nonderivative cross-claims 
strengthens and clarifies Sutton v. Otis. 
Defendant Pro-Tech argues that in requiring an independent cross-
claim, Randle "cuts against the reasoning of the court in Sutton. . . ." and 
would require Sutton's reversal. Pro-Tech's Brief at 16, 29. Pro-Tech also 
claims that the Sutton court advocated a "more liberal interpretation of the 
statute" to avoid injustices. Id. 
An examination of Sutton shows, however, that Randle does not 
depart from either its holding or analysis. Thus, for example, Randle fs 
reliance on an independent cross-claim arises directly out of the language 
and facts in Sutton. The Sutton Court noted that one defendant had enough 
evidence to bring a separate and distinct lawsuit. 249 P. at 454. Moreover, 
that defendant had indeed filed a separate suit on the same subject matter 
against its co-party in federal court. Id. at 455. In Sutton the court 
characterized the issue as: "Were [the co-parties] both on the same side 
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within the meaning of the statute?" Id. at 458. In Randle, the Utah 
Supreme Court merely requires the co-parties to demonstrate that they are 
not on the same side. 
Sutton's plea for "a more liberal interpretation" directly refers to a 
separate opinion in which Justice Cherry advocated never granting 
additional peremptory challenges. 249 P. at 457. In rejecting this approach 
and providing for additional challenges, Sutton emphasizes that the 
standard is high and only rarely should courts grant more peremptories. 
Id. at 458. 
Finally, Utah courts, are governed by the principle of stare decisis. As 
enunciated in State v. Menzies, this means that lower courts follow 
precedents set within their jurisdiction. 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (March 
29, 1994). A court may depart only if "clearly convinced that it was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions 
and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent." Id. 
Here, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled twice on the issue of peremptory 
challenges, once in 1926 and again in 1993. The latter case clearly provides 
the most convincing precedent.1 
C. Randle's requirement of nonderivative cross-claims strikes 
the best balance. 
Defendant Pro-Tech contends that it is unfair to deny additional 
peremptory challenges except when a co-party has filed an independent 
cross-claim. Pro-Tech's Brief at 23-27. It argues that the requirement 
1 Pro-Tech also argues that surrounding jurisdictions provide a better rule of law. 
This argument, whether true or not, misses the same fundamental principle of 
jurisprudence. When a state court of highest jurisdiction speaks, the lower state 
courts follow that precedent. State v. Menzies., 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (March 29, 
1994). 
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encourages litigation and would allow hostile co-parties to be deprived of 
even one challenge. Id. at 23. Since joint tort-feasors can no longer seek 
contribution, Pro-Tech claims that most defendants have little incentive to 
file cross-claims. Id. at 27.2 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically recognized the fairness issue in 
Randle. There it stated, "While there may be some unfairness in requiring 
hostile co-parties to join in making their peremptory challenges, granting 
co-parties on one side of a lawsuit additional challenges places the opposing 
side at a disadvantage. . . ." 862 P.2d at 1333. The Court, aware of the 
disadvantages to both sides, determined that the greater unfairness lies in 
granting additional challenges when no substantial controversy exists.3 
Pro-Tech's concern with all types of cross-claims illustrates that it has 
not understood the language in Randle. There, the Court stressed that the 
cross-claim must be "in effect, a separate, distinct lawsuit. . . ." 862 P.2d at 
1333. It specifically rejected the type of cross-claim Pro-Tech describes in 
2
 Pro-Tech claims that employers cannot file cross-claims against employees acting 
within the course of employment. Pro-Tech's Brief at 23. The argument contains no 
cite to either case law or statutory authority. 
3 Defendant Pro-Tech cites to International-Great Northern R. Co. v. Smith, 269 S.W. 
886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) and 32 A.L.R. 3d 747 for support. The International case, 
rather than illustrating Pro-Tech's position, actually demonstrates the unfairness in 
allowing co-parties who do not file independent cross-claims to obtain additional 
peremptories. In that case, a railway company impleaded two employees and sought 
thereby to obtain additional challenges. The court rejected this attempt noting that to 
do otherwise would allow a party to multiply its peremptory challenges. 
Similarly, Pro-Tech's reliance on A.L.R. author Donald E. Evins and Mourison v. 
Hansen is misplaced. In fact, Mr. Evins criticizes the Mourison decision to grant 
additional peremptories. He states that the court reached its conclusion "regardless of 
the fact that the term 'party' in such statutes so frequently has been construed to 
mean all on one side of an action. . . ." 32 A.L.R. 3d at 767. Mr. Evins describes the 
traditional view as holding that the "plurality of litigants on a side does not increase 
the number of peremptory challenges except where their interests are positively 
made to appear diverse or antagonistic." Id. 
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its argument on employers and contribution: "When, however, a cross-
claim is merely a derivative of the original action, such as a cross-claim for 
indemnification or contribution, a 'substantial controversy' does not exist 
for the purposes of Rule 47." Id. (emphasis added). 
D. Rule 47fc) and Randle's interpretations do not violate any 
constitutional provisions. 
In Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that "legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional. . . ." 
817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). It further warned, "those who challenge a 
statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating 
its unconstitutionality." Id. Moreover, concerning issues on appeal, the 
Court has cautioned, "A fundamental principle of judicial review is that, 
when possible, [courts] refrain from deciding constitutional questions." 
State v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1990) 
In this case, Defendant Pro-Tech raises several constitutional attacks 
on Rule 47(c) and its exception embodied in Randle v. Allen. In making this 
charges, however, Pro-Tech generally neglects to cite any authority. 
Therefore, it fails to meet the heavy burden called for in Greenwood. 
Even considering Pro-Tech's arguments, they lack merit. For example, 
Pro-Tech claims that a strict interpretation of Rule 47(c) and Randle violates 
equal protection guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
However, in 1960, the Utah Supreme Court rejected an equal protection 
challenge to the requirement that peremptory challenges be exercised 
jointly. State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689, 697 (Utah 1960). 
While Rivenburgh concerns peremptory challenges in the criminal context, 
the Court specifically noted that "where the matter of equal protection of 
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the laws is involved, there is no essential difference between civil and 
criminal rights." Id. 
Pro-Tech also argues a violation of the privileges and immunities 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on the fact that other 
jurisdictions have more lenient rules. Pro-Tech's Brief at 18-19. Contrary 
to Pro-Tech's assertion, the privileges and immunities clause does not 
guarantee citizens of Utah the same state rights as those in other 
jurisdictions. Rather it insures that those venturing into Utah from another 
state will have the same rights as Utahans. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 
395 (1948). Utah laws do not need to conform to another state's idea of 
justice. 
Finally, Pro-Tech contends that a strict interpretation of Rule 47(c) 
and Ran die violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. Pro-Tech's Brief at 19-20. Due process demands 
only that the questioned law is not "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, 
and that means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the 
object." Nebbia v. People of State of New York, N.Y., 291 U.S. 502, 525 
(1934). In this case, Pro-Tech claims that the requiring a co-party to share 
peremptory challenges "limits the effectiveness of counsel." As Nebbia 
makes clear, "The Constitution does not guarantee the unrestricted privilege 
to engage in a business or to conduct it as one pleases." Id. at 527-28. 
Because Pro-Tech has not met its burden in challenging the 
constitutionality of Rule 47(c) and the Randle exception, its attack must be 
rejected. Moreover, even a superficial analysis of Pro-Tech's claims shows 
that they are without merit. 
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Point 4: Defendants fail to establish a substantial 
controversy between them. 
Even if one accepts the argument that Randle v. Allen does not 
require the filing of an independent cross-claim, Defendants still fail to 
show that a substantial controversy existed. The facts offered by 
Defendants invariably fall into one of the categories deemed inadequate by 
Randle. For example: 
1. Liability shifting: All of the Defendants argued that each had an 
interest in shifting the blame to another and that there had been "finger 
pointing." Smith's Brief at 22-25, Pro-Tech's Brief at 33, Pleasant Grove's 
Brief at 26. Defendants supported this claim in particular by emphasizing 
the controversy between Smith and Pro-Tech. 
However, Randle states that a substantial controversy does not exist 
simply because co-parties attempt to shift liability to the other. 862 P.2d at 
1332. 
2. Separate answers, separate counsel, separate preparations: 
Defendants each point out that separate counsel was necessary and that all 
of them filed separate answers with separate preparations. Smith's Brief at 
23-24, Pro-Tech's Brief at 32-33, Pleasant Grove's Brief at 23-24. 
As the Randle Court emphasized: "Sutton expressly held, however, 
that these factors by themselves do not establish the existence of adverse 
interests for purpose of the rule." 862 P.2d at 1332. 
3. Different theories of negligence, different defenses, different claims 
resting on different facts. Defendants argue that the complaint alleged 
different theories of negligence requiring Defendants to prepare different 
defenses. Smith's Brief at 21, Pro-Tech's Brief at 34, Pleasant Grove's Brief 
at 24. 
In rejecting these factors, the Randle Court noted, "That approach, 
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however, would entitle co-defendants to extra peremptory challenges in a 
majority of multiple-defendant cases, thereby imposing a significant 
disadvantage on plaintiffs." 862 P.2d at 1333. 
4. Failure to cooperate and hostility. Defendants primarily rely on 
the fact that Defendant Smith claimed that Defendant Pro-Tech asked him 
to lie about the accident. Defendant Pro-Tech denied this accusation. 
Smith's Brief at 23-25, Pro-Tech's Brief at 32-33, Pleasant Grove's Brief at 
25. 
Randle rejected this type of squabbling as inadequate. The Court 
noted that Sutton held that uncooperativeness did not create a substantial 
controversy. 862 P.2d at 1332. Moreover, in acknowledging that some 
unfairness may result, the Court nonetheless requires hostile co-parties to 
join in making their peremptory challenges. Id. at 1333. 
In addition to the factors listed above, Defendants make much of the 
fact that counsel for Ms. Carrier acknowledged Pleasant Grove's interests as 
"disparate." Smith's Brief at 19-21, Pro-Tech's Brief at 34, Pleasant Grove's 
Brief at 21. Counsel's "concession," however, is insignificant for the 
following reasons. 
First, as Randle emphasizes, it is not the party's characterizations that 
matter. Rather, the "trial judge must carefully appraise the degree of 
adverseness among co-parties. 862 P.2d at 1333. Second, "disparate 
interests" is not the proper standard. Under both Randle and Sutton, the co-
parties must be involved in a "substantial controversy." Third, although 
counsel did verbally state that Pleasant Grove had disparate interests, at no 
time in the accompanying motion and legal memorandum did Ms. Carrier 
suggest or agree that Pleasant Grove was entitled to additional 
peremptories. Fourth, the legal standard in Randle, the filing of an 
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independent cross-claim, had not been announced. Since counsel became 
aware of Randle, he has never backed away from insisting that Pleasant 
Grove did not merit additional challenges; it had not filed an independent 
cross-claim. 
Finally, Defendant Pleasant Grove provides some examples of 
"conflict" during the trial proceedings.4 Pleasant Grove's Brief at 24-25. 
These examples, however, are irrelevant to the issue of substantial 
controversy. The trial court made its decision to grant additional 
peremptory challenges before trial began. Accordingly, the Utah Court of 
Appeals should only consider the evidence before the trial judge at that 
time. See King v. Special Resource Management, Inc., 256 Mont. 367, 374, 
846 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1993) (In deciding whether co-defendants are truly 
adverse, court reviews only materials available at point of which ruling was 
made and examines that information only as it was available to the trial 
court before its ruling). 
Point 5: Ms, Carrier need not show actual prejudice. 
Defendant Smith argues that even if the trial court erred in granting 
Defendants additional challenges, Ms. Carrier must show that this error 
manipulated or controlled the outcome. Smith's argument ignores the 
language and reasoning in Randle. 
4 Ms. Carrier objects to much of Defendant Pleasant Grove's characterizations in these 
examples. For example, Pleasant Grove repeatedly harps on the "fact" that counsel for 
Ms. Carrier emphasized a theme of "conflict" calling it the "paramount issue." 
In fact, counsel for Ms. Carrier emphasized a theme of dishonesty among 
Defendants. The lies, accusations, and blame shifting relate more to honesty and 
credibility than they do to conflict. Moreover, the transcript clearly states that 
counsel called truth the paramount issue in the case. Transcript Vol. XI-R. 2555, lines 
5-11. 
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As Randle emphasized, showing prejudice would require Ms. Carrier 
to "'discover the unknowable and to reconstruct what might have been and 
never was. . . . '" 862 P.2d at 1334, citing Blade v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317, 322 
(Colo. 1985). The Court termed this as "impossible." 862 P.2d at 1334. 
Accordingly, the Court held that the granting of additional peremptory 
challenges, especially when there is a significant disparity in the number, as 
in this case, is prejudicial error. Id. 
Point 6: The jury's verdict is not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
Defendant Pleasant Grove first challenges Ms. Carrier's statement that 
city employees testified that the City had failed. Pleasant Grove's Brief at 
27. On this issue, Ms. Carrier cited to testimony by both Public Works 
Director Frank Mills and Chief of Police Michael Ferre. Appellant's Brief at 
23. In Mr. Mills case, he was asked whether he would agree that if the 
downed stop sign had been missing for a number of days, the City's 
surveillance system would have failed. Mr. Mills responded: "Yes. I 
answered that way in my deposition." Transcript Vol. V-R. 1981, lines 17-
21. Chief Ferre similarly testified that a downed sign for a number of day 
would mean that the City's system had been "ineffective." Transcript Vol. 
IV-R. 1855, lines 16-19. 
Second, Defendant Pleasant Grove quarrels with Ms. Carrier's 
statement of the standard of review. Pleasant Grove denies that the 
standard is "substantial evidence," ignoring the cases cited in Ms. Carrier's 
brief and insisting that the standard be "competent evidence" citing Rees v. 
Intermountain Health Care Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991). In a case 
decided after Rees, the Utah Supreme Court characterized the standard as 
requiring substantial and competent evidence. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 
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I l l , 115 (Utah 1991). In any case, Ms. Carrier asserts that the jury verdict 
does not meet the standard. 
A. Ms. Carrier correctly marshaled the relevant evidence. 
Next, Defendant Pleasant Grove claims that Ms. Carrier failed to 
marshal all of the evidence. Pleasant Grove then proceeds to list several 
pages of "evidence" in support of the verdict finding it 0% negligent. As a 
whole, this list has three problems. 
First, many of the facts listed by Pleasant Grove are already contained 
in Ms. Carrier's marshaling of the facts. For example, indented paragraphs 
5, 18, 29, 39, 41, 43, and 44, all appear in Ms. Carrier's Brief. Moreover, 
while some of Pleasant Grove's statements add more detail, the basic fact is 
contained in Ms. Carrier's statements. See indented paragraphs 19 and 42. 
Specifically, Pleasant Grove's statements on how the streets being plowed 
are basically embraced by Ms. Carrier's statement #3—on days with heavy 
snowstorms, not all streets would be plowed, etc. See indented paragraphs 
8, 22, 24, 25, and 32. Concerning paragraph 45, although Ms. Carrier did 
not list it in her section on marshaling, it is contained in the argument 
section. Ms. Carrier's Brief at 23. 
Second, some of the facts are irrelevant because they concern 
subsequent measures taken by Pleasant Grove. Thus, indented paragraph 
1, stating that Officer Shepherd contacted city workers immediately after 
the accident and that those workers responded quickly has nothing to do 
with allowing the stop sign to go unreplaced for 1-2 days. Likewise with 
paragraphs 15 and 40. 
Third, most of the Defendants' statements do not support the verdict 
and therefore are not relevant. Testimony, for example, detailing Pleasant 
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Grove's duty to watch for downed signs meets one of the prima facie 
elements of Ms. Carrier's case; it does not support a finding of 0% 
negligence. See indented paragraphs 2, 13, 14, and 21. Similarly, the City's 
testimony on its standard of care is also an element of Ms. Carrier's case. 
See indented paragraph 16, 34, 35, and 38. 
Moreover, evidence that a witness does not recall or does not know 
something supports neither Pleasant Grove nor Ms. Carrier. See indented 
paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 17, 23, 27, and 30. Testimony about the size of 
the patrol force or the snow removal crew is not relevant since the City 
never relied on this as a defense. See indented paragraphs 12, and 37. In 
addition, because Ms. Carrier did not claim negligence based on a city 
employee knocking over the stop sign, that testimony is also irrelevant. See 
indented paragraphs 28, and 31. 
Pleasant Grove lists as a fact Mr. Holdaway's statement that his 
present memory was vague. See indented paragraph 8. Ms. Carrier did not 
include this because the relevant testimony, used by both parties, on the 
time period for the missing stop sign came from Mr. Holdaway's deposition. 
In the deposition, Mr. Holdaway stated "My recollection would be that it 
was not more than a day or so, possibly two, but I wouldn't think that it 
would exceed that." (Transcript, Vol. III-R. I486, lines 3-15). Rather than 
supporting the verdict, as Pleasant Grove asserts in paragraph 10, this 
information tends to point out the City's failure. 
Finally, Pleasant Grove lists the jury verdict, and the fact that it was 
unanimous, as evidence. See indented paragraph 47. This, of course, is not 
a fact before the trial jury and has no place in marshaling the evidence. 
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B. The clear weight of the evidence contradicting the jury's 
verdict, is not based on assumptions. 
Defendant Pleasant Grove maintains that in order to find the City 
negligent, the jury had to make two assumptions. Furthermore, Pleasant 
Grove contends that the jury's refusal to make these assumptions justifies 
its verdict. Defendant's argument ignores the facts. 
First, Pleasant Grove claims that Ms. Carrier wanted the jury to 
assume that the stop sign had been down more than one or two days. Not 
surprisingly, Pleasant Grove offers no cite to the record or Ms. Carrier's 
brief for this claim. In fact, at trial Ms. Carrier merely claimed that the stop 
sign had been down for one to two days, as evidenced by her witness's 
testimony: "My recollection would be that it was not more than a day or so, 
possibly two, but I wouldn't think that it would exceed that." (Transcript, 
Vol. III-R. 1486, lines 3-15). Moreover, throughout the appeal Ms. Carrier 
has never asserted otherwise. See Ms. Carrier's Brief at 7, 12, 22. 
Second, Pleasant Grove claims that the jury would have to assume 
that City employees actually went through the intersection between the 
time the stop sign was knocked down and when the accident occurred. 
Pleasant Grove's Brief at 39. Pleasant Grove Street Superintendent testified, 
however, that upon arriving at the accident scene, he noted that both 1100 
North and 500 East had been plowed. Accordingly, making no assumptions 
at all, some city employee had been through that intersection and plowed 
the roads. On the other hand, for Pleasant Grove to assert that after a 
heavy snowstorm, no employee plowed 1100 North, a busy collector road, 
would be incredible. 
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Point 7: Ms, Carrier properly presented the right of 
way issue. 
As a preliminary matter, Defendant Pro-Tech argues that Ms. Carrier 
has failed in presenting her right of way argument because she did not 
"provide the court with the testimony supportive of the instruction and the 
verdict." Pro-Tech's Brief at 37. It is unclear to what Pro-Tech refers. 
However, to the extent that Pro-Tech suggests that Ms. Carrier must 
marshal evidence before attacking the jury instruction, Pro-Tech is in error. 
As State v. Carter declares, "Whether a trial court correctly refused to 
give a particular jury instruction is a question of law." 256 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3, 17 (Jan. 18, 1995), cited by Pro-Tech at 37. Questions of law are 
reviewed for correctness and no deference is given to the trial court. Ong 
InVl (U.S.A.), Inc., v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). 
Therefore, there is no need to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's 
ruling. 
In substantively attacking Ms. Carrier's argument on the right of way 
instruction, Defendants argue that each party is allowed to have its theory 
of the case before the jury. Ms. Carrier supports this principle in her 
opening Brief. Ms. Carrier's Brief at 24. In addition, Ms. Carrier did not 
object to Defendants' attempts to present their theories in the jury 
instructions. Rather, Ms. Carrier simply requested the Court to present her 
theory unhampered by the alternate theory upon which Defendants relied. 
Defendant Pleasant Grove contends, however, that Ms. Carrier was not 
entitled to have her theory before the jury because it contained a 
controverted fact. Pleasant Grove's Brief at 40. This position finds no 
support in Utah law, moreover it logically does not make sense. It is the 
province of the jury to decide issues of fact. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 51 (1994) (The jurors "are the exclusive judges of all questions of 
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fact."). Therefore, under Pleasant Grove's argument, no party could get its 
theory to the jury because both claims and defenses rest upon controverted 
facts. If the case did not have controverted facts, it would be ripe for 
summary judgment. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) 
(1994)(Judgment to be given if "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). 
Finally, Defendant Pleasant Grove argues that Ms. Carrier did not 
establish that confusion resulted from the court's instruction. Pleasant 
Grove's Brief at 43. Under Utah law, however, Ms. Carrier need only show 
that the jury instruction "tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 
complaining party." Davidson v. Princey 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App. 
1991)(emphasis added). Ms. Carrier demonstrated this tendency on pages 
26-27 of the opening brief. As emphasized there, in combining both 
Defendants' and Ms. Carrier's proposed instructions the court did not allow 
for the fact that 1) one stop sign was up and the other down at the 
intersection, 2) Ms. Carrier's state of mind, or 3) that for more than twenty 
years traffic on 1100 North had the right-of-way due to the existence of 
two signs. From Mr. Smith's perspective, the intersection may have been 
unregulated; to Ms. Carrier it was regulated, hence the confusion in the jury 
instruction. 
Point 8: The trial court allowed Defendants to make 
improper use of a rebuttal, impeachment witness. 
Defendants argue that the trial court properly allowed Mr. Knight to 
take the stand and to testify outside the scope of direct examination. This 
argument ignores, however, the role of rebuttal evidence. In Randle v. 
Allen, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[r]ebuttal evidence is evidence 
tending to refute, modify, explain, or otherwise minimize or nullify the 
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effect of the opponent's evidence." 862 P.2d at 1338. 
In this case, Ms. Carrier wanted to use Mr. Knight's deposition 
testimony to impeach the defendant Pleasant Grove's position on 
reconstruction issues, and generally on the issue of credibility. As counsel 
for Ms. Carrier emphasized to the jury, "Mr. Knight is an accident 
reconstructionist specialist who was designated by Defendant, Pleasant 
Grove City, in this case as their expert on reconstruction." Transcript Vol. X-
R. 2439, line 22 to 2440, line 4 (emphasis added). Pleasant Grove 
announced to the jury at the beginning of trial that it would call Mr. Knight 
as an expert witness. Not surprisingly, despite this representation, it 
deliberately chose not to call Mr. Knight, who agreed with Ms. Carrier's 
expert on many important issues. Instead Pleasant Grove chose to rely on 
Dr. Blotter's reconstruction testimony presented by Pro-Tech which differed 
from Ms. Carrier's expert and Mr. Knight. 
Contrary to Defendants' allegations, Ms. Carrier did not choose to call 
Mr. Knight as a witness. Rather, pursuant to Rule 32, Ms. Carrier informed 
the court that she only intended to use limited portions of the deposition for 
impeachment purposes. The court allowed Mr. Knight to take the stand, 
over Ms. Carrier's objection and upon Defendant Pro-Tech's insistence that 
he be present in person. 
It is Ms. Carrier's position that Mr. Knight never should have been 
allowed to take the stand. Pleasant Grove had waived their right to call Mr. 
Knight and elicit testimony on any and all issues in his deposition. Pleasant 
Grove rested its case without calling Mr. Knight. Rule 32 explicitly provides 
that a deposition may be used for any purpose at trial. 
Here Ms. Carrier's stated intention was to simply read portions of the 
deposition without Mr. Knight appearing, as provided by the Rule. The most 
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Defendants can argue is that they would be allowed to read additional 
portions of the deposition, under Rule 32, to the jury. Rule 32 does not 
provide that the witness must be present in court for any of Defendants' 
stated reasons of context, foundation, or background. The court clearly 
abused its discretion in granting Pro-Tech's demand that Mr. Knight be 
present. 
Despite Mr. Knight's presence on the stand, counsel for Ms. Carrier 
held to his original stated Rule 32 presentation of the witness deposition 
testimony. Thus, in beginning examination, counsel for Ms. Carrier stated 
"This will be the easiest examination you've ever had in your life, Mr. 
Knight. I'm going to get four or five yes's [sic] out of you, so just sit back 
and relax. . . . And basically I'm going to read along, and ask you if what 
I've read is correct, and then we'll move on to the next." Transcript Vol. X-
R. 2440, lines 9-19. During this period, generally, the only time counsel 
stopped reading from the deposition was to mark exhibits and respond 
briefly to topics raised in Defendants' voir dire questioning, permitted by 
the court. 
After allowing Mr. Knight to take the stand, the court compounded 
its error by: 1) allowing any cross-examination outside reading additional 
portions of the deposition text (Rule 32); and 2) thereafter by allowing 
cross-examination on new topics not raised in the depositions portions read 
by counsel for Ms. Carrier. Defendant Pleasant Grove contends that cross-
examination outside the scope of this rebuttal was permissible since it 
covered material offered elsewhere in Mr. Knight's deposition. Pleasant 
Grove's Brief at 46. Defendant Smith claims that cross examination can be 
employed to take information gained in rebuttal and use it to establish 
different facts. Smith's Brief at 36-37. Defendant Pro-Tech argues that 
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examination beyond the scope of rebuttal to add "foundation and context." 
Pro-Tech's Brief at 42. 
All of these arguments, however, step outside the proper role of 
rebuttal evidence and the use of a deposition under Rule 32. Rebuttal 
testimony, by its nature, must be limited to impeaching the matters at issue. 
People v. Brooks, 621 N.Y.S.2d 701, 704 (1994). Therefore, cross-
examination should not be allowed to go beyond the direct impeachment. U.S. 
V. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (2d Cir. 1989). 
In this instance, Defendants raised an entirely new issue, i.e. which 
party had the right-of-way. It is undisputed that the right-of-way issue was 
not mentioned anywhere in the depositions portions read to the jury. The 
court's ruling allowed Defendants to raise this issue for the first time in trial, 
during Ms. Carrier's impeachment testimony. They had previously chosen not 
to call Mr. Knight or to put on evidence of this issue, thereby waiving the 
right to bring it before the jury. 
Finally, Ms. Carrier's counsel attempted to deal with the court's errors 
by examination of Mr. Knight following Pro-Tech's improper "cross-
examination." Therefore, although Defendant Pro-Tech introduced the right-
of-way issue, Ms. Carrier's counsel had no choice but to engage in damage 
control at that point. The court's rulings allowed "the horse out of the barn." 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments the opening Brief and those found in this 
response, together with the evidence on record, Ms. Carrier respectfully 
requests the Utah Court of Appeals to reverse and remand this case. 
DATED this 23rd day of March, 1995. / /dftt /? + 
LY^"CTHARRIS T 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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